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Post by 1949 on Apr 15, 2005 19:34:24 GMT -5
Avakian mentioned in his "Democracy: More Than Ever We Can and Must Do Better Than That" that if the masses in China were allowed to literally vote Mao out of office, then what you would have ended up with was that someone who was less capable of doing his job--or, even worse, someone who was working to undermine and overthrow the socialist system--would probably end up doing his job. I think the situation is similar with regards to the personal lives of socialist leaders: if we forced them to do their own laundry, shopping, etcetera, then someone less capable of doing their job--or, even worse, someone who is working to undermine and overthrow the socialist system--would end up doing their (the leaders') jobs in the time that the leaders are wasting doing their personal shit.
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Post by 1949 on May 3, 2005 21:23:13 GMT -5
In a thread in the "Articles Worth Posting" forum, where the discussion was about whether or not religious people can be politically progressive, Redstar2000 wrote: "Guess what? You know that there were even SS men who found the holocaust repugnant...to the point of deliberately helping a handful of Jews escape from trains bound for Auschwitz.
"Want to call them "progressive Nazis"?"
I found the remark about "progressive Nazis" to be sort of ironic in light of something I found very odd in reading chapter seven of Saving Private Power: The Hidden History of "The Good War", by Michael Zezima. Zezima discusses how the U.S. employed various ex-Nazis in their imperialist ventures after World War II. And then, on page 161, Zezima just sort of arbitrarily interjects this paragraph:
"The Soviets, for their part, also recruited from the ranks of ex-Nazis. One prime example was SS General Hans Rattenhuber, formerly the commander of Hitler's personal SS guard, who became a senior East German political police official in East Berlin."
Zezima provides no source for this allegation (although I would expect it comes from Parenti's Blackshirts and Reds, which is cited earlier in the book and which purportedly has a section contrasting the different ways the governments of east and west Germany treated ex-Nazis). If this is really true, though, it warrants a damn good explanation, IMHO. Could it have been related to the fact that the eastern European People's Democracies never really were socialist, and, contrary to Zezima's claim that it was the Soviet's fault, the new revisionist east German rulers did this on their own? Or could it have been done by the Soviets after the 1956 revisionist coup? What does everybody think?
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Post by celticfire on May 7, 2005 2:24:29 GMT -5
Actually, Mao could have been formally ousted, and I agree with Comrade Avakian that goes to show how much popular support Mao had among the masses (not because of a cult, either) but the masses knew Mao was a good leader of the proletariat --- and he was --- but my point is as time goes on I think there should be less privledge for leaders - not more. Mao also had a private swimming pool (it was the party's CC but he was the only one that usually used it) but he also swam in the Yangtze (sp?) river with everyday Chinese people. My point is that we should never lavish privledge upon our leaders, but should only provide them the required things they need to be leaders (like Mao's horse.)
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flyby
Revolutionary
Posts: 243
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Post by flyby on May 7, 2005 11:57:50 GMT -5
It is great (in my opinion) that several of our comrades are really trying to dig in on these points, to understand the relationship between democracy and dictatorship in the transition to socialism. Celticfire writes: "Mao could have been formally ousted, and I agree with Comrade Avakian that goes to show how much popular support Mao had among the masses but the masses knew Mao was a good leader of the proletariat --- and he was."The danger of "ousting Mao" did not come from any "formal" procedures of voting (at congresses or central committee meetings) -- but rather from the attempts to seize power that arose from bourgeois headquarters within the party that represented a different line (i.e. a capitalist road). And their method was not usually (or mainly) to "oust" him -- but to "take him out of the loop," make him a figurehead, while implementing their own line in an all-round way. This was exactly what happened after the Eighth Party Congress (in the late fifties) -- and was only really reversed after a decade of struggle, when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutoin was unleashed in the mid-sixties. Part of what I'm saying is that formal voting procedures at a national level aren't really a guarantee that the line that serves the people will win. And (in fact) if the revolutonaries don't actively fight for their line among the people -- and train people broadly to grapple over the cardinal qustions of society and revoluton -- then all the votes in the world won't save the revolution. Which highlights the reason to dig into the "three sentences on democracy" from Avakian that are posted here: awip.proboards23.com/index.cgi?board=theory&action=display&thread=1115237665Now on the question of "popular" -- that is contradictory. In the 1930s, China was a house of horrors -- huge parts of the country were dominated by vicious warloards, the burden of feudal society was intense, mass famines swept the land, a century of imperialist intrusion now was capped by a Japanese invasion that brought nightmarish oppression to large parts of the country. And by contrast, after the successful liberation struggle led by Mao -- after all the bitter warfare, sacrifices and dislocation -- China came out the other side united for the first time, in a new way. it was proud and strong and defiant in the face of imperialism. Feudalism was overthrown in a profound and sweeping movement. China stepped onto the road of socialist industrialization -- creating both the basis for a modern economy and the beginning shoots of a socialist social order. Education, medicine, end of corruption, major public works like dams canals irrigation and wells.... the exciting changes brought to China's people by the liberation struggle were undeniable and breath-taking. And people loved Mao for that. However there were still classes and class struggle, and Mao's approach as a communist remained extremely controversial after liberation -- as powerful forces (both high in the party and in upwardly mobile sections of the masses) aspired to a capitalist road (seeing "modernization" and "industrial power" as the key goals of China, not socialist and world revolutoin). And inevitably (because of the nature of our world) those who argued for a focus on "modernization as the key link" also were arguing for new and close relations with foreign imperialism. So it was hard for Mao's enemies (or anyone) to "knock" or "negate" or simply overthrow mao -- because of the tremendous respect for his leadership of the liberation struggle. But his communist program of continuing the revolution was controversial at every step -- and throughout society. And it was not so simple that the masses "knew Mao was a good leader of the proletariat" -- especially because his communist strategic approach of continuing the revolution (which is exactly what made him a communist leader of the proletariat in the correct sense) was quite controversial, and had to be fought for, through ocmplex struggle, including among the masses of people. celtricfire writes: "My point is as time goes on I think there should be less privledge for leaders - not more. Mao also had a private swimming pool... but he also swam in the Yangtze (sp?) river with everyday Chinese people. My point is that we should never lavish privledge upon our leaders, but should only provide them the required things they need to be leaders (like Mao's horse.) "Here is how I view this: It is correct and necessary to fight to transform the contradiction between mental and manual labor, and correctly handle the objective and lingering contradictions inherent in the existance of leader and lead. I don't think the heart of that is "privileges" -- but overall line of where society should develop. I think that in general there are inevitably complex and stubborn inequalities left over from the old society -- that must be tackled and transformed as part of the transition to communism. And, as a general principle, communists performing key functions in society should be at the front of that struggle -- both in what they advocate and fight for -- butr also (if secondarily) in how they themselves live and work. I don't think it is correct to view Mao as a person who had "privileges." Fundamentally, his conditions of life were very different from the poorest peasants in China, of course. But how could they not be? He needed conditions for leading the revolution, for playing his role, for maintaining his health and for maintaining his security (including when you realize that there were repeated attempts by reactionaries to assassinate him.) Mao did, on special occasions, swim in the river as a symbolic statement -- that he was vigorous and on the scene, that the politics of china were still filled with struggle and people should not be complacent, that a communist ideologically needs to be prepared to "swim in stormy weather." But it is not like he went down to the neighborhood gym, or went to the beach regularly with everyone else -- because that would not be possible or correct. And looking at that, objectively and clearly, why our leaders can't just be "one of the guys," why they can't just wander around unprotected, or spend their time doing their own laundry (or maybe holding some day job to pay the rent?).. gives you a sense of why these contradictions (even under socialism) are so stubborn. I don't think it was wrong for mao to have facilities to "work out." And more: I don't think this really where we want to look to uncover the dangers and problems of previous socialist societies? Again, I don't think the roots of restoration lie in "privileges" (in the main) but in major two line struggle over the whole direction of society (capitalist road vs. socialist road). The proof of the correct line being in command is not whether top leaders have to go to the local Y to work out, or do their own shopping. The sign of a correct line overall is how the society is being transformed, whether the contradictions and remanants of capitalism are being restricted and overcome to the maximum degree possible, whether broader and broader sections of the people are being brought into grappling with the complex issues of doing that. etc.
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Post by celticfire on May 8, 2005 0:00:32 GMT -5
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Post by 1949 on May 13, 2005 17:05:41 GMT -5
Is anyone going to answer my point about the Soviet Union hiring ex-Nazis
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Post by repeater on May 15, 2005 16:28:03 GMT -5
This is where the absurdity of the 1956 line comes out. If the eastern european governments are revisionist prior to 1956 what does that make the Soviet Union?
And how can the Soviet Union be revolutionary after it has invaded Poland, Finland and the Baltic States; signed secret pacts with the Nazis; torpedoed revolution in the rest of the world in the interest of the Soviet Union's fight with Germany; executed over 700,000 of its citizens, etc. And how is it that the move in leadership from Stalin to Kruschev does anything, but make the counter-revolutionary undercurrents explicit.
Those are an awful lot of broken eggs that need to be justified, but the end result of them is Krushchev so maybe there is no justification.
I'm not suprised that the Eastern Bloc would have made use of Nazi's. It really doesn't seem to be the worst thing that was done and I'm sure there are all kinds of reasons why it was "ok".
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flyby
Revolutionary
Posts: 243
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Post by flyby on May 18, 2005 12:48:08 GMT -5
This is where the absurdity of the 1956 line comes out. If the eastern european governments are revisionist prior to 1956 what does that make the Soviet Union? I don't think the logic holds here. In fact the Soviet Union had had a socialist revolution. But the transformations in the rest of Eastern Europe never really took root. It is quite possible for the Red Army to hold power in Poland, or Hungary, or Eastern Germany, and yet not be able to really unleash a deep socialist process there. The point is: Capitalism did not "jump out of no where" in the Soviet Union in 1956. By 1945 (and even earlier), the revisionist forces in the Soviet Union were very strong, and the Army was (in fact) one of their strongholds. There was a leap then in the superstructure -- new lines, policies and class forces finally came to overall power. And then unleashed a process by which the "color" of the society overall changed systematically. And how can the Soviet Union be revolutionary after it has invaded Poland, Finland and the Baltic States; signed secret pacts with the Nazis; torpedoed revolution in the rest of the world in the interest of the Soviet Union's fight with Germany; executed over 700,000 of its citizens, etc. And how is it that the move in leadership from Stalin to Kruschev does anything, but make the counter-revolutionary undercurrents explicit. The things listed here are a mixed bag of points. Faced with world war against the Nazis (who had a highly mechanized modern army of 3 million, the Soviet Union took strategic areas to prevent the nazis from taking them. A Nazi assault on Moscow would have been much easier if it has started from lithuania, or estonia, rather than from western poland. If you look at these events closely, they are more complicated than just "invasions." For example, Jewish people in eastern poland were thrilled (and saved) when the red army marched in (instead of the nazi army). On the other hand, it is true that there are many things to "grieve" in this history. And it is true that the Soviet leadership saw little distinction between the state interests of their socialist country, and the international interests of the proletariat. And this approach (this "two into one" approach) led them to take quite nationalist stands, and even discourage revolution in several important cases. (Mao said Stalin told him not to go for power in china.) How do we tell the difference between "a socialist country making serious mistakes" and a "capitalist country carrying out counterrevolutionary policies"? That is in many ways, the question here. After krushchev an all-around reactionary policy came to power, that literally called for an end to revolution. And called for an end to the dictatorship of the proletariat. And that worked systematically to unleash profit a the guiding principle of the economy and society. And these moves were based on forces (and policies) that had long had powerful influences within the Soviet Union.
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Post by repeater on May 18, 2005 22:55:22 GMT -5
To what extent do you think this is an accurate statement? The Soviet Union was comprised of Russia and its empire. To what extent were there revolutions in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Siberia, etc?
With regards to the Baltic states and Poland I don't really think that conquest of neighboring nations should or can be justified based on strategic necessity. This is an imperialist line, reminiscent of the justifications behind numerous wars of the American empire.
I would point out that had the Soviet Union entered the War in 1939 the outcome would have likely been alot different. The success of the Nazi's in the East and the West in the early parts of the War was predicated on their ability to concentrate on either theatre at their choosing. Then again it is quite possible that the 37-38 purges were directly responsible for an inability to do this (if there really was an inability).
I think the molotov-ribbentrop pact is not something to be defended, because defending it defends the concept of the primacy of the Soviet Union and the subordination of world revolution to its interests. Moreover the conquest of these areas did not prove to be a defensible position when the Nazi's finally did invade, and in the case of the Baltic states and Finland the Soviet conquest undoubtedly gave impetus to Nazi collaboration.
I believe that imperialism was fully expressed in the Soviet Union by at least 1945, if not earlier. I believe that this was the case in fact, even if it was not openly stated by Stalin or others in the CPSU and not recognized by the ICM.
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Post by RedWinter on May 19, 2005 0:21:10 GMT -5
the Molotov Ribbentrop pact was just an attempt to buy time for the USSR to build up its forces to beat down nazi germany. if it did not do this, and jumped right into war as you seem to be suggesting they should have done, then the USSR would have been crushed by the superior firepower of the german military and the nazi empire would have extended from the atlantic to the pacific. not a particularly great situation for the world revolution. so i think in this case it was a good option for both the ussr and the world. the soviets did conquer berlin, didn't they?
the other western imperialist powers were not particularly interested when the ussr made overtures about an attack on nazi germany, so they would have been on their own
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Post by 1949 on May 19, 2005 20:07:55 GMT -5
I wrote some stuff on the nonagression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany and the war between the Soviet Union and Finland for a history class. I'll type that stuff up when I get it back from my teacher. For now, I'd just recommend checking out the sections on WWII in Another View of Stalin and The Stalin Era. www.plp.org/books/Stalin/book.htmlwww.plp.org/books/strong_stalin_era.pdfI thank Repeater138 for being the first to acknowledge the issue with the Soviet Union hiring ex-Nazis, and I hope other comrades (coughcoughFlybycough) follow suit.
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Post by 1949 on Jun 14, 2005 17:28:47 GMT -5
Okay, here is something similar to what I wrote for that class on the Soviet war with Finland and the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. On the Soviet War with FinlandIn the early years of the war, the Soviet government, knowing that a German attack was inevitable, was concerned about the security of Leningrad (modern-day St. Petersburg), which was a mere 32 kilometers away from the Soviet Union’s border with Finland, a nation which, after the Soviet government so generously granted independence from Russia in 1918, aided in the German invasion of Russia during the Russian Civil War, and had since then been ruled by a series of reactionary pro-German governments. On October 14, Stalin and Molotov sent a memorandum to the Finnish government asking for Finland to cede by lease to the Soviet Union the Port of Hanko and four islands, in order to "block access to the Gulf of Finland". The memorandum, keeping in mind the security of Finland, also asked for a portion of the isthmus of Finnish Karelia, in exchange for a portion of Soviet Karelia which was twice the size. After Finland refused with encouragement from Germany, the Soviet Union had no choice but to declare war on Finland on November 30. So what did the imperialists do? Recognize that the Soviet Union had a legitimate concern about the defense of their socialist society? No! They expelled the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, and within three months Britain, France, the U.S. and Italy sent 700 planes, 1,500 cannons and 6,000 machine guns to Finland to defend against Soviet "aggression". General Weygand of France went to Syria and Turkey to prepare to attack the Soviet Union from the south; and the French Chiefs of Staff prepared to bomb the oilfields in Baku, which the Soviet Union relied upon for the 23 million tons [barrels? I might have messed up here – 1949] of oil it produced a year. The French government, having not fired a single shot against Germany, prepared a force of 50,000 men to fight the Soviets in Finland (!), while British Prime Minister Chamberlain declared Britain would send twice that many number of troops. Fortunately, those troops never made it to Finland, which signed a peace accord with the Soviet Union on March 14, 1940, allowing the Soviets to advance their defenses by 150 to 300 kilometers, which were crucial to the defense of Leningrad and Moscow. Even after this victory for the Soviet Union, the imperialists tried at various other points to "switch the war" into a joint attack against the Soviet Union; Rudolf Hess, number two in the Nazi Party (NSDAP), landed in Scotland in March of 1941 to attempt to negotiate such a deal. A day after Germany finally invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, U.S. Senator Harry S. Truman arrogantly [and famously – 1949] declared that the U.S. should wait to see who is winning and then aid the losing side so we kill as many as possible. And President Roosevelt described to his son how the U.S. strategy was to let the Soviet Union which fought eighty percent of the German army themselves—bear the brunt of the German attack, and then have the imperialists move in for the kill. On the Nonaggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet UnionWorld War II itself had only really been fought as a dispute between Britain and Germany over the 1939 nonaggression pact signed between Germany and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, Britain and France had repeatedly ignored the Soviet Union’s pleas for an alliance against Germany. The pact, often decried by the bourgeoisie as an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union that gave Hitler an excuse to invade Poland, was in fact simply a reaffirmation of the neutrality broken off between the two countries in 1933. Had the pact not been signed, Germany would have invaded Poland, and then the Soviet Union, anyway; the difference would have been that Britain and France would have supported Germany, since they had a mutual interest in destroying the Soviet Union. The pact made the pro-Hitler sections of the British bourgeoisie (which comprised almost the entirety of that class) turn against Germany, creating an embarrassing public scandal in which Neville Chamberlain was eventually forced out of office and replaced by Winston Churchill, who had always opposed Hitler (even though he (Churchill), like his liberal colleague, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had always, before the war, been an ardent supporter of "that admirable Italian gentlement" (Roosevelt’s words), Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator of Italy who was obviously allied with Hitler). The pact also angered Italy, keeping them out of the war until a bit later on; Japan, keeping them from attacking the Soviet Union at all; and Spain, keeping them out of the war altogether. SourcesLudo Martens, Another View of Stalin. Available online at: www.plp.org/books/Stalin/book.htmlAnna Louise Strong, The Stalin Era. Available online at: www.plp.org/books/strong_stalin_era.pdfMichael Zezima, Saving Private Power: The Hidden History of "The Good War". Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues.
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Post by 1949 on Jun 14, 2005 20:19:29 GMT -5
Also, Repeater138, what do you mean that "I believe that imperialism was fully expressed in the Soviet Union by at least 1945, if not earlier"? Does that mean you believe the Soviet Union was capitalist "by at least 1945, if not earlier"? Lenin in Imperialism set forth a scientific definition of capitalism at the stage of imperialism, characterized by "1) the concentration of production and capital...developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital," of a financial oligarchy; 3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities [acquiring] exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which share the world among themselves, and 5) territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers...completed." (page 106) If you believe the socialist Soviet Union was imperialist by 1945, then logically you are saying it was capitalist by that date. Unless, of course, you are using a "classic" definition of imperialism, like that put forward by Rosa Luxemburg, that just means "invading and/or annexing territory." This idealist conception of imperialism fails in that it does not take into account the possibility of neo-colonialism, whereby the oppressed nations are formally independent (for the most part) but are still dominated by the developed monopoly capitalist powers economically, and thus politically--which seems to be the "preferred" form of imperialism of most imperialists today. So which is your definition, Repeater138?
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Post by nando on Jun 15, 2005 12:28:26 GMT -5
I think repeater's conclusion (that the USSR was imperialist by 1945 when its armies entered central europe) raises the basic theoretical questions "what is imperialism? What is socialism? what is capitalism?"
Is imperialism a classless characteristic of any state that sends troops outside its own (previously established) borders? Are there somehow socialist-imperialist states as well as capitalist ones?
Or put it another way: After the Soviet Union had driven the German army from the previous borders of its territory (which were themselves defined in large part by the PREVIOUS german imperialist offensives against the early Soviet state!) what should a socialist state do?
Was it wrong to pursue the retreating Nazi armies to Berlin, and end the Nazi rule there? Was it wrong to (for example) liberate the countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Austria from the Nazis? Was it wrong to TRY to initiate a socialist process in those countries?
Was that "imperialist" somehow?
Overall, I am one of those who thinks the Soviet Union was (in the main and fundamentally) a socialist country in those years. And think that though there were many and major problems, the actual pursuit and defeat of the Nazi regime was not one of them.
And then, on the other hand, there was sharp struggle within the Soviet Union -- literal class struggle -- over what would be done, and what the USSR would fundamentally be.
The Soviet Army was not, in the main and overall, a stronghold of the more revolutonary forces within the USSR -- it went over in a powerful way to Russian nationalism, and a view of oher peoples (including German people) that was far from internationalist.
As a result, there were some profound and negative aspects to the Soviet advance into eastern europe that should not be ignored (including for example instances of rape as the Soviet forces advanced, and not only isolated ones). Or for example the fact that german prisoners were treated as lifetime enemies.
And i also think there was an overall problem of "realpolitik" and pragmatic approach to policies -- one that said "such a policy would be wrong if the capitalist did it, but since we are socialists it is different." And this is raised rather sharply in Avakian's discussion of "means and ends." And reflects a rather wrong approach that has had a deep influence among communists since.
I think, for example 1949 does a good job of explaining the reasoning and "logic" of the Soviet approach to finland. Finland was a Nazi ally, and it was a strategic danger to Leningrad. Similarly, when the Nazis invaded western Poland (1939) -- there was a strategic logic for sending Soviet troops into eastern Poland (to move the Soviet front line defenses farther west.)
But it is fundamentally wrong to argue "well, since we are communists defending socialism, whatever we do is then a communist thing to do." We know now (what the Communists of the USSR of that day did NOT yet grasp) that there was a powerful capitalist, imperialist and restorationist force emerging (within their state, party and army) that would soon grab power. And who can deny that the unleashing of Russian nationalism, and of cynical realpolitik, and of a whole approach of "no omlets without broken eggs" ultimately contributed to that, and helped it grow unchecked? What were in fact revisionist forces implementing revisionist (and actually capitalist) policies and approaches formed a very influential part of all of this.
So it is not like we say "before 1956, everything was socialist, and so everything they did was acceptable and should be defended." Mao said that socialism is (at best) a checkerboard -- where communist and capitalist roads sharply contend, and where many (even most) institutions are often under capitalist control! Seeing the soviet union through THAT prism, looking at Avakian's arguments around "means and ends," and looking back with the summation possible from our vantage point -- gives us a way to look at this "from the mountain" (not in a mechanical, defensive way that implies we unhold "whatever was done, at whatever cost to people and the revolution."
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Post by 1949 on Jun 15, 2005 22:35:54 GMT -5
My intention was not to argue that "well, since we are communists defending socialism, whatever we do is then a communist thing to do," or that "before 1956, everything was socialist, and so everything they did was acceptable and should be defended." In fact, there is a thread in the theory forum where I question whether or not the Soviet Union's resistance to German aggression was revolutionary at all.
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